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ABSTRACT 
The 200-mile exclusive economic zone for fisheries management 
is criticized by some as being inconsistent with demands for a New 
International Economic Order. This paper ex amines the implications of 
the new fisheries regime for the developing countries. While the 
regime is no panacea, it will improve the allocation of resources and 
the bargaining leverage of developing countries. Their long run 
success in achieving nutritional, employment and commercial benefits 
will depend upon availability of infrastructure and venture capital 
for processing and marketing of the catch, sea-orientation among the 
people and the pattern of economic concentration within. 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE NEW 
REGIME FOR F ISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
Manjula R. Shyam 
Demands for equitable sharing of resources in the 
international arena have been raised for many years. They have been 
reflected in the call for a New International Economic Order (N IEO) at 
the 6th and 7th Special sessions of the UN General Assembly and at the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I I I). 
It appears paradoxical that a movement to achieve an equitable sharing 
of the newly found wealth of the oceans should have resulted in the 
extension of national jurisdiction in the form of exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ). In this paper I examine the compatibility of the new 
fisheries regime with the N IEO. After summarizing the provisions of 
the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Draft Treaty) I discuss 
the implications of these provisions for the developing countries. In 
the next section I identify some developing countries which will gain, 
lose or not be affected by the new regime. I conclude by examining 
the validity of the criticisms that the new fisheries regime is 
inconsistent with the NIEO. 
The Draft Treaty provides for a 200-mile EEZ in which the 
coastal stat� has exclusive rights for the exploration, exploitation, 
management and conservation of the living resources. The Draft Treaty 
places obligations corresponding to these rights on the coastal state. 
The coastal state is obligated to conserve the resource, to fully 
utilize the resource by sharing the surplus with other states, 
specially the landlocked and other states with special geographical 
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characteristics, and to consult with other states and relevant 
regional organizations with respect to the exploitation of anadromous 
and catadromous stocks, highly migratory species and transnational 
stocks. 
IMPL ICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
One easy way to calculate the benefits of the new regime for 
the developing countries is to look at their relative gain in ocean 
space. The 200-mile jurisdiction will benefit states selectively 
depending on their geographic location and configuration of the 
coastline. Several large developed states will gain enormous ocean 
space and many developing states which are landlocked will gain 
nothing. Even though the Draft Treaty provides for special rights of 
the landlocked states in the EEZs of neighboring coastal states, they 
are at best promises for an uncertain resource largely dependent on 
the willingness of the coastal state. This gain in ocean space is 
presented in Table 1. 
[ Insert TABLE 1 Here ]
Those states which gain more than the average gain by coastal 
states under a 200-mile extension or whose gain in ocean space exceeds 
five times their land area are classified as having large gains. One 
hundred and forty-seven states on which data were available are 
included in these approximate calculations. About ten states have 
missing data but they would not greatly alter the relative proportions 
of the large and small gainers. Over one-fourth of all developing 
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TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF STATES GAINING LARGE* AREA IN EEZ 
Large Gain Small Gain Total 
Developed 1F 12 25 37 
states % (33) (6 7) (100 )
Developing 1F 30 80 110 
states % (27) (73) 000 )
* States gaining more than the average gain of coastal states or whose 
gain in ocean space exceeds five times their land area. 
Source: Compiled from Tables 2 and 3 in Manjula Shyam "Rights of the
Coastal States to Fisheries Resources in the Economic Zone: An Empirical 
Analysis of State Preferences " Ocean Management 3 (1976): 18-19. 
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states will benefit significantly by the extension of jurisdiction. 
If we exclude the 21 developing states which are landlocked from the 
calculations, (they lack an orientation to the sea, did not develop 
ocean fishing in the past and are unlikely to do so in the future )
one-third of all the developing coastal states will gain from the 200 
mile EEZ. 
However, the calculation of the relative gain in ocean space 
gives only a partial picture. The biological productivity of the 
waters of the ocean varies significantly. On the basis of presently 
harvested catch, it is clear that most of the productive waters are 
off the coasts of developed countries. In 1975, 66.7 percent of the 
world catch came from developed countries and 33 .3 percent c ame fro11i'
the developing countries.1 Rough estimates available for the location 
of the marine catches indicate that in 1970-75 a little less than half 
the catch was taken by the developed countries from coasts of other 
countries. Of the catches by vessels from developed countries less 
than half were taken off the coasts of developing countries. A few 
developing countries also caught a very small fraction of their total 
catch from the coasts of other developing countries as can be seen in 
Table 2. Approximately 10-15 percent of the total world catch is 
taken off the coasts of developing countries primarily by the 
developed countries. The economic significance of this catch may be 
greater than the tonnage suggests. Long distance fishing fleets have 
generally concentrated on species with wider consumer acceptance and 
consequently of greater economic value. 
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[Insert TABLE 2 Here ]
Thus the immediate effect of the 200-mile EEZ will be to place 
developing countries in a position to derive some benefit from 10 - 15 
percent of the world catch which is presently caught off their coasts 
from which they do not benefit at all. Obviously the establishment of 
the principle of control over the natural resources of the EEZ does 
not mean that the developing countries will be able to harvest those 
resources themselves immediately. But assuming that the developing 
countries are willing to sell the surplus catch for payment for 
license fees, they will be able to obtain some revenues even in the 
short run from this heretofore unproductive resource. The long run 
prospects are brighter. To the extent that a developing country not 
only lands but also processes and markets the catch from their EEZ the 
new fishing regime can contribute significantly to employment and 
economic value in terms of net protein for domestic consumption and 
earnings in foreign exchange. 
There is another way to characterize the benefits from the 
EEZ. The potential of the oceans is unevenly realized at the present 
time. Certain regions of the oceans are fully exploited with several 
species being overexploited while others are exploited considerably 
below their potential. Figure 1 shows the resource potential in 
different oceanic regions. While 61 percent of the total catch now 
comes from the coasts of the developed countries, it,has been 
estimated on the basis of rough calculations that 60 percent of the 
potential world fishery resources are to be found off the coasts of 
developing countries.2 This implies that the greatest gains in 
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TABLE 2 
LOCATION OF MARINE CATCHES IN 1972, BY ECONOMIC GROUPINGS 
Percent of 
Economic 1972 World 
Cate�ory Catch Taken by 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Total 
6 1  
39 
100 
Percent of Catch Taken by Location 
Off Own 
Coast 
58.3 
95. 1 
Off Other 
Coasts 
41.7 
4.9 
Off Coast of 
Developed 
Countries 
31.0 
2.7 
Off Coast of 
Developing 
+ Countries 
+ 10.8 
+ 2.3 
Source: Table 24 in Sidney Holt "Marine Fisheries." Ocean Yearbook 1. 
University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
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commercial fishing catch in the next decades will come from the 
unexploited and underexploited stocks within the EEZs of developing 
countries which will reverse the ratio of the present yields from the 
developed and developing countries. As Figure 1 shows, these 
underexploited areas include South West Atlantic, Western Indian 
Ocean, Western Central Pacific and to a lesser degree, Western Central 
Atlantic, Eastern Central Pacific, Eastern Indian Ocean and North East 
Pacific, all of which border on developing countries. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here ]
Thus a discussion of the potential benefits that will accrue 
to the developing countries from the 200 mile EEZ must include not 
only those resources that are presently taken by other countries but 
also the currently unexploited resources which may be exploited in the 
future and which they would not have been able to benefit from without 
the new fisheries regime. 
A third way of looking at the effect of the new fisheries 
regime on the developing countries is by classifying all countries 
into three categories; gainers, losers and states not affected.3 The
key variable is the presence or absence of foreign fishing vessels 
within 200 miles from their coasts. Gainers are those developing 
countries in whose waters foreign vessels used to operate, losers are 
those developing countries who used to fish off the coasts of other 
countries and the unaffected are the other developing countries. 
Countries of West Africa such as Senegal, Mauritania and Pacific 
island states such as Western Samoa and Fiji fall in the first 
FIGURE 1 
PRODUCTION AND POTENTIAL OF THE WORLD'S OCEANS, 1970. 
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Source: Figure 2 in Sidney Holt, "Marine Fisheries." Ocean 
Yearbook 1. University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
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category; Thailand, Cuba, South Korea fall in the second and India, 
Sri Lanka, Somalia, etc. fall in the third unaffected category. 
GAINERS, LOSERS AND UNAFFECTED STATES 
Gainers: 
In the short run such states will have two options; joint 
ventures with transnational enterprises (TNEs) or licensing foreign 
fishermen. While there had been sales and joint ventures before, the 
new fisheries regime will improve the economic and political leverage 
of the coastal state in both these situations. The buyers will have 
fixed costs and idle capacity in capital and human resources as a 
result of the new regime. The rent that the sellers can extract will 
be influenced by the value and size of the stocks, distance from the 
major markets, the size of their infrastructure and their negotiating 
skill. License fees can be an important source of capital for the 
developing countries enabling them to increase the indigenous capacity 
by acquisition of motorized vessels, improved nets and processing and 
refrigerating equipment. There are certain advantages in an outright 
sale of surplus stocks. A sale is usually made for one or two years 
at a time and enables the coastal state to adjust the amount to its 
own increasing capacity. It gives the coastal state freedom and 
flexibility to buy the technology, fishing vessels and equipment which 
are most suitable to its needs and are cost competitive from anywhere 
in the world market. 
Terms of an international joint venture can include training 
of local personnel at all levels, location of freezing and processing 
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plants in the coastal state and investment in infrastructure such as 
ports, roads and electricity generating plants among other things 
which can be useful to the coastal state in integrating fisheries with 
its larger development plans.4 Again, the terms of the joint venture 
can vary significantly depending on the attitudes and policies of the 
host country towards foreign capital. The growing awareness of the 
significance of marine fisheries as a result of UNCLOS I I I  and the 
rising costs of fuel in operating distant water fleets strengthen the 
bargaining position of the coastal state. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization can also provide expert assistance to the developing 
countries in drawing up contractual arrangements for joint ventures 
which protect their vital interests. 
The future success of states in expanding their capacity to 
catch, process and market their resources in the EEZ will depend on 
their economic, political and demographic profiles. Idiosyncratic 
factors such as goals and stability of the political leadership and 
administrative system will undoubtedly play a role. A simplified 
model to predict long run outcomes is shown in Table 3. 
[Insert TABLE 3 Here] 
Infrastructure here refers to the rate of capital formation 
and the amount of trained human capital even though they may not 
currently be invested in fisheries. The argument is that if the 
country has the capital and technology they can be diverted into 
expansion or ports, fishing fleets and processing facilities. Small 
island states are at a disadvantage by virtue of their limited 
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TABLE 3 
LONG RUN PROSPECTS OF EXPANDING FISHING CAPACITY (With Examples) 
Availability of 
Venture Capital & 
Infrastructure 
High 
Low 
Sea Orientation 
High 
High 
(Brazil) 
Mexico 
Moderate: 
directed towards 
domestic consumption 
(Fiji) 
Low 
Moderate: 
directed towards 
foreign markets 
(Angola) 
Low 
(Mauritania) 
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resources. The second independent variable which is often overlooked 
is the orientation to the ocean; that is, development of consumer 
preferences and domestic markets and existence of seafaring 
traditions. A large scale vigorous fishing industry almost always 
presupposes high consumer acceptance of seafood in the domestic 
market. The presence of rich fishing grounds off the coast, however, 
does not mean that fish is an acceptable food to the coastal 
inhabitants. There are wide areas of fish avoidance in Africa and in 
Asia which are not explained by unavailability of fish in the coastal 
waters. Dietary preference is a complex socio-cultural phenomena 
which is not understood very well. Little is known about how a change 
in dietary habits of a population can be brought about. The point 
that I am making is that states with equally rich fishing grounds may, 
have varying levels of success in achieving self-sufficiency in 
exploiting their EEZs themselves and perhaps two critical factors are 
the size of the infrastructure and the place of salt water fish in the 
diet of the local inhabitants. 
Brazil may be seen as one examp �e of a gainer. Brazil 
declared a 200 mile territorial sea in 1970. The rich shrimp grounds 
off its coast were then dominated by U.S. shrimp boats. Since the 
200-mile EEZ secures to a coastal state similar rights over the living 
resouces, Brazil's experience can be seen as a likely effect of the 
new fisheries regime for other states. A U.S.-Brazilian shrimp 
agreement was first concluded in 1972 and has been renewed 
periodically. Each renewal reduced the permitted number of U.S. 
vessels and increased the license fees. After 1977 U.S. participation 
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in shrimp fishing is allowed only in the form of joint ventures. Thus 
foreign involvement in Brazilian fisheries continues but is on 
Brazilian terms and has diminished over time.5 
Mauritania is another example of a gainer.6 It is a poor 
coastal desert country. The Canary current leads to upwelling in this 
region making the coastal waters of Mauritania among the most 
biologically productive in the world. A recent French report assessed 
the value of the annual catch off Mauritania at about $2 billion. 
Vessels from 20 countries fished in this upwelling region with only 
minor economic benefits accruing to Mauritania. 
The new fisheries regime may change the situation. 
Mauritanian officials have increased the license fees they are 
charging foreign factory ships, they are seeking international fund to 
buy trawlers, expand the port and storage facilities at Nouadhibou and 
for training their own crews. Mauritania is also seeking joint 
ventures with TNEs. The, extent to which Mauritania will benefit from 
perhaps its only resource is yet to be seen. 
Losers: 
There are only a few developing states which fish off the 
distant coasts of other states. Countries such as Cuba, Thailand, 
South Korea and Taiwan will experience disruptions and higher costs as 
they lose their free access to fishing grounds with the extension of 
national limits. 
These countries have the same options as the developed distant 
water fishing countries. They will have to seek bilateral 
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arrangements with coastal states. They may be at a disadvantage in 
competition with developed distant water fishing states because they 
do not have as much to offer in terms of sophisticated technology and 
because of limits to their overseas investment capacity. However 
their outlook is not all dismal. There are four reasons why 
developing countries may pref er bilateral arrangements with other 
developing countries instead of developed countries. First, the 
technology most relevant for developing countries is the technology 
used by other developing countries since they have common 
characteristics of lack of capital specially foreign exchange and a 
surplus of labor. The factory trawlers of Poland or Spain may be less 
useful to a developing country than the middle-water fishery built by 
Thailand. Secondly, developing countries may be more suspicious of 
large fleets of the Soviet Union or Japan than they would be of South 
Korea or Cuba. Thirdly, most developing countries are in the tropical 
regions while the developed countries have built their fishery on the 
resources of the temperate zones. This has important implications. 
In tropical waters there is a great intermixture of species and the 
harvesting, storing and processing techniques that are used by the 
developed countries for a single specie fishery are not very useful 
for developing countries. The management concepts of the temperate 
zones based on maximum sustainable yield of a single stock also have 
limited applications for multiple species fisheries. The approach to 
management evolved by developing countries would have greater 
relevance for other developing countries. Fourthly, even though the 
"losers" will no longer enjoy open access, and have to pay sizeable 
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license fees, their economic loss may not be as great. Common 
property fisheries are marked by over-capitalization. The economic 
rents that were being dissipated through excessive amounts of capital 
and labor may be captured under the new regime. 
A few remarks about Thailand may be pertinent here.7 Thai 
marine landings increased by 760 percent between 1958 and 1976. Trawl 
fishing was first introduced as a result of a Thai-German project in 
1961 and grew rapidly so that demersal species now comprise four­
fifths of the total catch. The ready availability of venture capital, 
the introduction of effective gear that could be used on indigenous 
boats and the sea-going traditions of the Thai people made this 
bilateral project one of the most successful ever undertaken. There 
is a tremendous proliferation of fish species in Southeast Asia with 
individual trawl hauls containing two hundred species not uncommon. 
The Thai experience in exploiting multiple species is of great 
relevance to other developing countries. The shrimp and other 
acceptable species are sorted out from the mixed catch. The "trash" 
fish or fish for which there is not a ready market which constitute 
one third of the catch are not discarded dead at sea but are used for 
duck food, catfish food or for the production of fishmeal. Likewise, 
the overcapitalization and overfishing in the Gulf of Thailand that 
resulted from the failure to limit entry of new vessels in the Gulf is 
also instructive for developing countries that are making ambitious 
plans to modernize their fishing industry. 
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Unaffected States: 
Most states will not be affected by the new fisheries regime 
in the sense that there was no significant foreign fishing in their 
waters and they will not lose access to waters in which they used to 
operate before the extension of national jurisdiction. Countries of 
South Asia like India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and of East Africa like 
Somalia, Kenya fall in this category. However even the "unaffected" 
states will benefit from the salience of marine fishing as a result of 
the new fisheries regime.8 Indeed, in many countries new 
administrative departments for fisheries have been set up or given a 
more prominent place in the list of national priorities. 
Somalia is another interesting case.9 Somalia has the longest 
coastline of any African state. The presence of the Somali current 
and coastal upwelling makes the EEZ of Somalia highly productive. 
Somalia has a high proportion of nomadic people in its population. 
Perhaps as a result of the contempt that pastoral nomads have for a 
sedentary life, there is widespread traditional cultural deterrence to 
eating fish.IO Consequently the rich fishery resources of the Somali. 
coast are largely unexploited. 
In 1972 while there was no fishing industry to speak of, a 
Ministry of Fishery was formed by the Somali government and under its 
aegis four fishing villages were set up as the first phase of a long­
term economic and social development program to utilize the coastal 
marine resources of Somalia. Negotiations for joint ventures are 
under way with Japan, Italy and Yugoslavia. 11 Whether this major
social experiment of change from nomadic pastoralism to sedentary 
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fishing will succeed is yet to be seen but it is certainly a dramatic 
example of the increased emphasis on development of marine resources 
in developing countries. 
CRIT ICISMS OF THE NEW FISHER IES REG IME 
While the old fisheries regime based on common property and 
open access has few supporters, the new regime resulting from UNCLOS 
III  too has met with its share of criticisms. The idea of national 
sovereignty, which is the basic principle underlying the new fisheries 
regime is seen by critics as being inconsistent with the NIEO. Four 
major weaknesses are seen in the new regime. 
Many developing states including some of the least developed 
state who are landlocked will not gain any benefits from the new 
regime. This criticism can be answered at three levels: 
a. Many of the least developed states such as Bangladesh, 
Somalia, Mauritania, Senegal and Maldives, to name a few, wiil 
benefit from the extension of national jurisdiction, control over 
foreign fishing, and the inclusion of plans for development of 
marine fisheries in the overall development plans and priorities 
as a result of the new regime. 
b. Even though the Draft Treaty provides for equitable rights 
for the landlocked in the EEZs of coastal neighboring states, 
their enjoyment of those rights will surely depend on the 
willingness of the coastat states. However a case can be made 
that in most situations the limited resources of developing states 
are best reserved developing inland fisheries that are closer and 
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more accessible. This strategy will not require modification of 
consumer tastes which is usually quite difficult. Even under the 
best of circumstances, Nepal and Afghanistan are unlikely to 
develop large scale marine fisheries. 
c. To criticise the new fisheries regime because it leaves 
out some states does not seem fair. The NIEO contains many 
elements that will benefit far fewer states. The demand for debt 
writeoff for example would benefit those who borrowed heavily in 
the past. The integrated program of commodities with fixed 
ceiling and floor prices or the indexing of the price of raw 
materials would largely benefit the few producer states among the 
developing countries. Even though most developing countries are 
not major consumers of these raw materials, indexing could add 
significantly to their bills specially if we take their foreign 
exchange earnings into account. The new fisheries regime in 
contrast will benefit a much larger number of developing countries 
and hurt only a very small number of developing countries. 
A second criticism of the new fisheries regime is that it will 
not make much difference in the status quo. The TNEs of the developed 
countries have been harvesting the resources and will continue doing 
so, albeit with the payment of nominal fees or under the guise of 
joint ventures. 
This is a more ·Serious criticism to which two responses can be 
given: 
a. The mechanized fishing vessels of the developed countries 
dominate world fish catch. The discrepancy in the catch by 
, ; ' 
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developed and developing countries is a result of technological 
disparities between them. This gap between the abilities of the 
developed and developing countries can be narrowed if there is a 
general realization that a world that suffers from gross economic 
disparities engenders stress and conflict. Furthermore, these 
disparities can be reduced not so much by means of aid as by the 
transfer of technology that will enable the recipient nations to 
develop the marine resources adjacent to their coasts. The new 
fisheries regime is quite compatible with such considerations. It 
establishes the principle of coastal state control over marine 
resources. 
b. The sale of surplus stocks or international joint ventures 
in fisheries are not inherently incompatible with the NIEO. The 
terms of the arrangements are the critical variable. For example, 
some developing countries may choose to rely upon extraction of 
revenues from users than to invest in fairly capital intensive 
technology for harvesting the catch beyond 50 miles from their 
coast themselves. The high fuel costs may make it impractical for 
a developing country to exploit the resources beyond a certain 
distance in the EEZ. 12 Revenues from the sale of resources in the 
deeper waters of the EEZ can be used to acquire medium depth 
trawlers or to build up roads and electricity generating plants 
that would benefit local fishermen operating closer to the coast 
where the richer fishing grounds may be located. Similarly in an 
international joint venture the terms of equity sharing are 
important. They can be oriented towards increasing the self-
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sufficiency of the coastal state and decreasing the share of the 
distant water fishing operators. Some joint ventures between 
Japan and Taiwan were quite successful in improving the fishing 
capacity of Taiwan. Most joint ventures require processing plants 
to be located in the coastal state and the hiring and training of 
local people at all levels of the operations. The new fisheries 
regime has the potential of improving the bargaining leverage of 
the coastal countries in setting the terms of the joint venture. 
A third criticism of the new fisheries regime is that it will 
merely graft the technology of the developed countries to the 
developing countries. Artisanal fisheries will suffer from neglect or 
destruction and capital intensive large vessels will be acquired which 
will concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a small wealthy 
group of people increasing unemployment and malnourishment in the 
country. 
This argument is just the �everse of that mentioned above. 
The fear is not that there will not be a transfer of technology but 
that there will be too much of it. The superimposition of expensive 
technology from the developed countries combined with existing 
economic imbalances will increase economic inequity within the 
developing countries leaving the large majority of people worse off. 
The validity of this charge is borne out in Mexico and Brazi1.13
However two responses can be made in defense of the new regime. 
a. Borrowing inappropriate technology is not an inevitable 
consequence of the new fisheries regime. Nor is there any 
guarantee that it would have been avoided if the entire area of 
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ocean space beyond the territorial sea had been placed under the 
managerial authority of an international body. The positive gains 
from the marine resources in the EEZ can be squandered by wrong 
decisions but such decisions do not necessarily follow from, nor 
are peculiar to the fisheries regime. 
b. The socio-economic structure within a country is a key
variable in the diffusion of the benefits from marine resources. 
The pattern of economic concentration in each country will 
determine whether the resources will be exploited for greater 
profits for the few or to meet the nutritional and employment 
needs of larger numbers of people. The domestic structure will be 
largely responsible for the success or failure of the new 
fisheries regime rather than any inherent inconsistency with the 
NIEO. 
A fourth criticism of the new fisheries regime is that it will 
render management of resources �ore difficult. Fish are mobile and 
swim inshore, offshore and alongshore. Additionally, as a result of 
interrelationships among stocks, the harvesting of one stock affects 
the yields of others. Exclusive control is inappropriate for shared 
stocks. 
The new fisheries regime is an improvement upon the common 
property regime based on open access which led to overcapitalization 
and overfishing. The management of stocks which lie totally within 
the EEZ of a single coastal state will become easier. By limiting 
users the new regime can prevent overfishing and also lead to greater 
efficiency in operations. 
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But it cannot be denied that in many regions of the world, in 
Southeast Asia or West Africa for example, the splintering and 
parcelling of the ocean will make management quite complicated. 
Regional arrangement will be necessary for the management of 
transnational stocks or stocks which swim both within and beyond the 
200 mile EEZs. It is true that such arrangements would be needed even 
if there were a single international authority to regulate the ocean 
space beyond 12 miles. Nevertheless, by reinforcing national autonomy 
and national sovereignty over the marine resources, the new fisheries 
regime makes it harder for nations to recognize the interdependent 
nature of the fish stocks and the need for regional management. 
CONCLUSION 
The Draft Treaty provides for a universally agreed new 
fisheries regime to replace the old regime based on unrestricted 
access which, it is generally accepted, led to overexploitation and 
economic waste. The new regime will provide for greater equity in 
allocation of catch and has the potential of giving greater control 
over the processing and marketing of the marine fisheries to the 
developing countries. However, the new regime is not a panacea. The 
technological and economic capacities of the developed and developing 
countries differ and even if we assume that some technology could be 
transferred it is not clear that such transfer would always serve the 
interests of the developing countries. The new regime will 
nevertheless improve the bargaining position of the developing 
countries. The Food and Agriculture Organization and the regional 
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commissions can provide useful services of expert advice and 
evaluation of options. However, nutritional and commercial benefits 
accruing to individual countries will vary considerably. While the 
jury is still out, it is safe to conclude that the new fisheries 
regime is not inconsistent with the N IEO. 
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